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ABSTRACT
This paper examines the case for fair shares of free time from a civic, or 
neo-republican perspective. I claim that, unlike liberal egalitarians like 
Julie Rose, who can make a straightforward case for free time, republicans’ 
theoretical commitments make it more appropriate for them to throw their 
weight behind a portion of time specially allotted for political activity. 
However, as I will show, republicans have strong instrumental reasons to 
endorse fair shares of free time for all citizens.  First, focusing on the idea 
of non-domination, I outline the typical preoccupations of republicanism 
that I believe have direct implications for how they ought to treat the topic 
of free time. Next, focusing on the case of domination in the workplace, I 
claim that fending off the threat of domination requires a substantial 
amount of time. Chiefly, workers need time to effectively participate in 
processes of justification and contestation, in order to uphold sturdy 
checking mechanisms that can protect them against domination. As a 
consequence, setting aside a window of time specially devoted to political 
activities, rather than free time in itself, is more consistent with the 
republican project. Nevertheless, in the final section, I conclude that “free 
time” would be instrumentally necessary on the republican picture. Fair 
shares of free time are a preferable means to achieving conditions of non-
domination than compulsory time for political activity, for practical and 
principled reasons.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Julie Rose has argued persuasively that liberal egalitarians ought to embrace 
free time as a distinct object of egalitarian concern. Specifically, she contends 
that free time, defined here as time that can be devoted to one’s chosen ends 
at one’s discretion, as opposed to time constrained by necessary activities, is a 
resource that citizens are entitled to a fair share of (Rose 2016: 39).1 This is 
because free time is a resource that is “generally required for the pursuit of 
one’s chosen ends, whatever those may be”, as well as “generally required to 
exercise one’s formal liberties and opportunities” (Rose 2016: 67). Rose’s book 
is a crucial intervention into the neglect of free time despite its political and 
philosophical significance. My contribution to the symposium further 
advances this goal by examining the case for a fair share of free time from a 
civic, or neo-republican perspective.2 I claim that, unlike liberal egalitarians 
like Rose, who can make a straightforward case for free time, republicans’ 
theoretical commitments make it more appropriate for them to throw their 
weight behind a portion of time specially allotted for political activity. 
However, as I will show, republicans have strong instrumental reasons to 
endorse fair shares of free time for all citizens.  
In Section 2, focusing on the idea of non-domination, I outline the typical 
preoccupations of republicanism that I believe have direct implications for 
how they ought to treat the topic of free time. In Section 3, focusing on the case 
of domination in the workplace, I claim that fending off the threat of 
domination requires a substantial amount of time. Chiefly, workers need time 
to effectively participate in processes of justification and contestation, in order 
to uphold sturdy checking mechanisms that can protect them against 
domination. As a consequence, setting aside a window of time specially 
devoted to political activities, rather than free time in itself, is more consistent 
with the republican project. Nevertheless, in the final section, I conclude that 
“free time” would be instrumentally necessary on the republican picture. Fair 
1 We should leave open the possibility that at least some non-citizens might be 
entitled to time-related rights, especially those who participate in the host country’s 
workforce. However, this discussion, as Rose’s does, will focus only on citizens.
2  Here, I don’t claim that republicanism is the theory of justice we ought to prefer. 
Rather, I am interested in seeing how much of Rose’s argument for fair shares of free time 
can be preserved in a different political framework, as well as calling attention to the 
temporal dimension within republicanism. Neither do I claim that the central argument I 
make for free time is the only republican path that can be taken to this destination. For 
example, the labor republicans discussed by Alex Gourevitch in From Slavery to the 
Cooperative Commonwealth (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) have 
contended that each person needed adequate time for political engagement and personal 
development. My intention is simply to highlight one of the core preoccupations of 
contemporary civic/neo-republicans and show how this might lead to a distinctive 
instrumental argument for fair shares of free time.
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shares of free time are a preferable means to achieving conditions of non-
domination than compulsory time for political activity, for practical and 
principled reasons.
2. CIVIC/NEO-REPUBLICANISM AND NON-DOMINATION
2.1 The definition of republicanism
Characteristically, republicans believe that the existence of domination 
is what makes the exercise of power unjust. I will avoid commenting on 
disagreements between various strains of civic republicanism, instead 
only seeking to outline what I take to be the fundamental tenets of a 
republican theory.  In line with Philip Pettit’s influential account (1997), 
there are three basic aspects to any dominating relationship. Someone 
has dominating power over another to the degree that they have the 
capacity to interfere, on an arbitrary basis, in particular choices that the 
other is able to exercise (Pettit 1997: 52-4). Interference may encompass a 
wide range of possible behaviors, including coercion of their physical 
body or will, as well as manipulation, which takes the form of agenda-
fixing, deceptively shaping people’s beliefs or desires, or rigging the 
consequences of their actions (Pettit 1997: 52). It worsens agents’ 
situations by altering their range of options, the predicted payoffs 
assigned to those options, or by establishing control over which outcomes 
will result from which options (Pettit 1997: 53). Importantly, it is not 
necessary that the dominating agent actually interferes with the 
dominated party; in fact, the person who enjoys that power need not even 
be inclined towards interference (ibid). The emphasis, instead, is on their 
effective capacity to interfere, which leads the power-victim to live at the 
mercy of the power-bearer (Lovett 2013: 98). In addition, exit costs on the 
part of the power-victim, which Frank Lovett terms “dependency”, play a 
role in determining a dominating relationship’s level of intensity. As he 
puts it, “the greater the dependency of subject persons or groups, the 
more severe their domination will be, other things being equal” (Lovett 
2013: 50). Suppose that leaving a dominating social relationship would 
worsen someone’s prospects, and that undertaking the move itself would 
impose further costs and risks (ibid). The higher the exit costs for the 
dominated party, the more leeway dominating agents have in treating 
her poorly, as they can do so with the knowledge that she is not likely to 
leave the relationship.
For my present purposes, I want to focus more closely on what it means 
for interference to be arbitrary. I take interference to be arbitrary when it 
 Domination and the (Instrumental) Case for Free Time 77
LEAP 5 (2017)
is only subject to the discretion or goodwill of the power-holder, and is 
not forced to track the interests of those who are interfered with (Pettit 
1997: 55).3 Of course, power-holders may freely cater to the interests of 
those they interfere with, like in the case of a benevolent dictator who 
cares deeply about the well-being of her subjects. Nevertheless, the 
benevolent dictator still dominates insofar as her interference is 
unchecked, unconstrained, or unaccountable (ibid). In what ways, then, 
can power-holders be “forced” to track the interests of their power-
subjects? Checking mechanisms – institutional arrangements that place 
limits on how power-holders may use their power – may perform these 
three functions:
a. Justification: ensuring that power is justified to its subjects, 
   whether by appeal to norms of public reason, and/or through 
   their participation in democratic processes;4 
b. Contestation: ensuring that subjects of the power are able to 
   protest if their interests fail to be met; 
c. Retribution: ensuring that power-holders are appropriately 
   punished if they do not track power-subjects’ interests. (Benton 
   2010: 408). 
As the next section will reveal, the need for robust checking mechanisms, 
especially those pertaining to justification and contestation, is of special 
importance to the relationship between republicanism and time.
To sum up, for republicans, society must aim for a distribution of 
rights, goods, and resources that secure each individual’s status as safe 
from domination. One necessary condition for non-domination, which I 
continue to focus on in the remainder of this article, is the existence of 
sturdy checking mechanisms that force power-wielding agents to track 
the interests of their power-subjects.
3 I leave open how “interests” ought to be determined.
4 For Benton, justification refers to governments having to give citizens reasons for 
their decisions, as well as being forced to respond to citizens’ interests through the 
democratic process. However, one concern is that she provides an incomplete account of the 
role of democratic procedures. Other than forcing reason-giving and responsiveness from 
those in power (termed the “output-based view” by Bellamy (2008)), democracy also 
encompasses participation that render decisions non-arbitrary (termed the “input-based 
view”). On the “input-based view”, it is not the content of the decisions made that renders 
power non-arbitrary, but my having equal status in public decision-making processes 
(Bellamy 2008: 164). While drawing on her categories, I depart from Benton by interpreting 
justification in the broad sense, taking it to include democratic justification through co-
authorship. On my view, democracy helps justify state power through compelling it to enact 
responsive policies, and the fact I am able to play a co-authoring role through participation.
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3. TIME AND NON-DOMINATION 
I will now establish the conceptual link between time and non-domination. 
Republicans, I believe, can make a distinct argument for free time that is 
nevertheless complementary to the liberal egalitarian one. To briefly visit 
the latter, I take it that liberal egalitarianism’s two central commitments 
are to individual freedom of choice, as well as some degree of equality in 
the distribution of society’s benefits. On this account, what will make the 
exercise of political power unjust is if citizens are unable to meaningfully 
exercise their individual freedom of choice, or because the distribution of 
society’s benefits is unequal to the extent that some citizens are significantly 
less able to utilize those liberties and opportunities. Consequently, it is not 
difficult to see why a fair distribution of free time ought to be championed 
by the liberal egalitarian. If the distribution of free time is inegalitarian, 
with some people enjoying a much larger amount of time that can be 
devoted to their chosen ends at their discretion than others, some citizens 
would be far less able, or even unable, to meaningfully pursue their projects 
and commitments.
However, looking to non-domination reveals a different path from 
which we might reach a similar destination. I make the following argument 
in two stages. In the first stage, I argue that there is an important temporal 
dimension to republicanism. As emphasized in the previous section, 
republicans greatly value the presence of checking mechanisms that 
ensure that power-wielders are forced to track the relevant interests of 
power-subjects. Given that successfully establishing checking mechanisms 
and keeping them in place is often very time-consuming, it is important 
that power-subjects have enough time to do so. To bring out the significance 
of time for republicans, I concentrate on the concrete case of non-
domination in the workplace. Chiefly, workers need time to establish or 
participate in crucial processes of justification and contestation that 
protect them against workplace domination. I expand on these points 
below. The second stage, which argues that free time – and not just time in 
itself – may be instrumentally necessary for us to have sufficient time for 
political activity, will be fully developed in section 4. 
Before I proceed, a note about how we ought to envision the relationship 
between my argument and the liberal egalitarian one is in order. As I have 
hinted, I view the republican case for free time as a friendly companion to 
the liberal egalitarian one. It does not challenge the premises of the liberal 
egalitarian argument, but simply brings out another important political 
function of free time. Assuming that relations of domination are a 
quintessential type of social inequality, where the dominated suffer an 
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inferior public status, it helps to bridge a key connection between free time 
and social equality – a connection that Rose’s account does not fully 
investigate. Combined, the two arguments help us build a strengthened 
case for fair shares of free time. 
3.1 Domination in the workplace
The extent of domination that can be found in present-day workplaces 
should not be underestimated. Elizabeth Anderson has made an explicit 
comparison between workplaces and authoritarian governments. For her, 
the workplace is akin to a private government where everyone must obey 
an assigned superior who is “unaccountable to those they order around”, 
as they are “neither elected nor removable by their inferiors”, and who 
issues orders that “may be arbitrary and can change at any time, without 
prior notice or opportunity to appeal” (Anderson 2015: 94). Similarly, as 
Alex Gourevitch puts it, 
“…the typical workplace is a site of domination not self-government, 
of arbitrary power not democratic control. Workers are subject to a 
panoply of rules, directives, orders, commands, whims, caprices, 
and impositions over which they have no legal control and that they 
have limited capacity to resist” (Gourevitch 2016: 17-8). 
While workplace domination may come in diverse guises, I will describe 
two forms that Gourevitch has helpfully identified: personal and structural 
domination. In line with the definition sketched out in the previous 
section, these forms of domination do not hinge on employers possessing 
malicious intentions, or even their actual interference with workers. It is 
enough for them to possess the capacity to do so, in virtue of current 
systems of employment that are routinely taken for granted. 
As a starting point, workers suffer personal domination when they are 
subject to the arbitrary authority of bosses whom they are conventionally 
expected to obey (Gourevitch 2015: 316). Employers have frequently been 
judged to be within their rights when subjecting workers to unreasonably 
harsh working conditions, or flat-out demeaning and humiliating 
treatment. These include being forced to work in extreme heat or physically 
hazardous but not illegal conditions, being forced to wear diapers rather 
than go to the bathroom, being refused lunch breaks, or being forced to 
take random drug tests (ibid).  Importantly, these exercises of power often 
go above and beyond what has been explicitly spelt out in contracts, and 
thus what has been assented to by the employee at the outset. This is 
because employers have the authority to specify underdetermined terms 
in work contracts, which are necessarily vague or incomplete (Gourevitch 
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2013: 607). For instance, despite the potential for wide-ranging disputes 
over conditions of employment, including questions about whether the 
political views or social media postings of employees are a reasonable 
basis for being fired, these decisions are largely controlled by employers 
(ibid). As this example reveals, vagueness or incompleteness paves the way 
for employers’ control to creep into employees’ off-hour lives. As Anderson 
observes, most believe that they cannot be fired for their off-hours 
Facebook postings, or for backing a political candidate their boss opposes, 
but only half of American workers enjoy even partial protection of their 
off-duty speech from employer retaliation (Anderson 2015: 95-6). In these 
ways, personal domination by employers goes beyond poor treatment 
during work hours: it involves the capacity to exercise insidious power even 
over intimate aspects of workers’ lives. 
On top of personal domination, workers also experience structural 
domination, which rises out of how they are forced to sell their labor-power 
in the absence of reasonable alternatives to wage labor (Gourevitch 2015: 
313). Many societies are structured such that some group of owners 
privately controls all of society’s productive assets, and non-owners are 
forced by the legally protected unequal distribution of productive assets to 
sell their labor to some employer or other (Gourevitch 2013: 602).  Because 
labor is forced, under the current structure of property-ownership, 
employers have the capacity to set arbitrary terms and conditions for job 
positions, with the knowledge that they will continue to be filled. Many 
end up working “longer hours, at lower pay, under worse conditions than 
they would otherwise accept” not because they want to, but because they 
must (Gourevitch 2015: 314). Echoing Lovett’s contention that dependency 
makes domination more intense, structural domination heightens 
personal domination because it makes workers dependent on employers 
for a living wage. In the absence of reasonable alternatives to selling one’s 
labor, there are onerous exit costs to leaving the job market. This 
dependency may be exploited by employers who force employees to work 
under harsh or punishing conditions precisely because they know the 
workers do not have adequate exit options. Furthermore, as Gourevitch 
notes, even if employers do not intentionally seek to take advantage of 
workers, exploitation is implicit in their economic decisions about firing, 
hiring, wages, and hours that presume a steady supply of economically-
dependent labor. Again, employers can fire a worker who challenges their 
authority, knowing they can most likely be easily replaced. In short, the 
exiting imposes asymmetrical costs on workers and employers. This has 
the effect of forcing workers to put up with bad jobs, while permitting 
employers to get away with exploitation and ill-treatment. 
 Domination and the (Instrumental) Case for Free Time 81
LEAP 5 (2017)
To be clear, the argument is not that all workers are equally dominated. 
Of course, there is a wide spectrum of domination across different lines of 
work, with some privileged classes of employees enjoying relatively low 
levels of personal and structural domination (compare a factory worker to 
a tenured university professor with multiple job offers). The extent of 
workplace domination that we experience may also be influenced by our 
individual career choices: if, for example, I chose to be a professional 
football player whose employers are considerably more dominating than if 
I had chosen the alternative of being a tenured university professor.5 
However, because of the underlying structure of property-ownership, all 
workers are dominated to some extent, and the privileged class of workers 
who experience trivial levels of domination is relatively narrow. 
Furthermore, I submit that there is a comparably narrow class of socially 
privileged people who have voluntarily chosen a more dominating job over 
a less dominating one, often because of other valuable payoffs (like fame 
and fortune in the football player case). More often than not, workers do 
not have access to less dominating alternatives that would not also be 
accompanied by significant exit costs, and this is the group that I take 
theorists like Anderson and Gourevitch to be interested in. Finally, it is 
worth noting that my voluntarily choosing a more dominating job over a 
less dominating one does not necessarily neutralize the wrong of 
domination. To see this point, suppose that I voluntarily choose to marry 
Adam over Ben with the knowledge that I am more likely to be dominated 
in my relationship with Adam, who has a rather controlling personality. Yet 
it would be misguided to say that my freely choosing Adam over Ben makes 
Adam’s dominating behavior over me morally acceptable. 
3.2 Domination and checking mechanisms
How ought we respond to these instances of personal and structural 
domination? Here, I want to focus on how checking mechanisms can help 
to reduce employers’ capacity for arbitrary interference. In 2.1, I introduced 
three types of checking mechanisms that force power-holders to track the 
interests of power-subjects: those that enable justification, contestation, 
and retribution. I now consider how these checking mechanisms bear on 
workplace domination. Specifically, I will explore how processes of 
contestation and justification that directly involve workers can be 
5 I thank Tom Parr for this example, and for pressing me on these points.
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implemented to keep employers’ arbitrary power in check.6
First, workplace decisions should be made robustly contestable by workers. 
In order to be emancipated from the relationships of domination they 
experience in the workplace, workers ought to organize themselves into 
political organizations and industrial unions, thus transforming the social 
and economic order (Gourevitch 2016: 25).7 This is because the formation 
of such organizations and unions would allow workers to robustly contest 
situations where their interests fail to be met through strengthening their 
collective bargaining power, thus empowering them to challenge 
arbitrarily-made decisions. If employees found themselves faced with 
unreasonable or humiliating demands from the employer, they could 
dispute these with the union’s backing. Being a trade union or staff 
association member has been shown to increase the odds of a problem at 
work being resolved satisfactorily (Compa 2004: 5). In addition, while being 
part of a union in itself does not give workers a direct say in determining 
the terms and conditions of employment, unionized workers typically 
enjoy significantly more favorable working conditions than non-unionized 
workers.8 
Workplace decisions should also be justified to workers. Notably, it has 
been suggested that a right to justification regarding the conditions of 
one’s labor should be understood as the extension of the moral right to self-
determination; “we have a right to demand and be given good reasons 
when deliberating over matters that affect us in important ways” (Borman 
2017: 82). One way the right to justification can be satisfied is for employees 
to participate in a system of co-determination, where they share control of 
an economic enterprise with providers of capital, such as through work 
committees and employee representation on boards of directors (Hsieh 
2008: 92). In order to ensure that employees are treated as fellow 
deliberators, instead of silent parties who passively wait to have rules or 
6 I do not claim that implementing such mechanisms would be sufficient to protect 
workers from domination. For example, they may need to be accompanied by measures that 
improve workers’ exit options, such as more generous welfare payments or a universal basic 
income. However, I don’t think that improving exit options on their own would be sufficient, 
as they do not address the domination suffered by workers who choose to remain employed. 
For this reason, the importance of contestation and justification remains.
7 It is important to note that, while Gourevitch believes that transforming the order 
requires workers to organize themselves in unions, it is also necessary for structural 
domination to be addressed at a deeper level by cooperatively organizing the means of 
production. I don’t disagree with the importance of changing the structure of employment, 
but here I choose to focus on what can be done to lessen domination within existing 
structures.
8 See http://www.epi.org/publication/briefingpapers_bp143/ for some statistics on 
this issue.
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decisions enacted upon them, they should be guaranteed the right to 
participate in determining the policies that affect them, as well as play a 
role in governing the enterprise more generally (ibid). Concretely, 
participation in decision-making would give employees the ability to 
determine the terms and conditions of their employment and the wider 
organization of their work, so that these do not lean entirely on the 
employer’s authority.
Of course, this is not to place all of the burden of protecting against 
domination on the workers themselves and detract from states’ 
responsibilities to their citizens. In fact, workers’ ability to form trade 
unions is heavily dependent on the existence of state-enforced labor laws 
that protect their freedom of association. I believe it is consistent, however, 
with the spirit of republicanism to pay significant attention to political 
action on the part of private citizens. 
3.3 Time and checking mechanisms
Now that I have identified two commonplace forms of workplace 
domination, as well as suggested two measures that could be used to 
address them, I will clarify the links between these and the subject of time. 
Chiefly, I contend that the establishment and maintenance of those 
checking mechanisms would require a substantial amount of time. If 
workers lack adequate time-resources to participate in these activities, as I 
believe many currently do, workplace domination would remain seriously 
unaddressed. Broadly speaking, individuals must possess adequate time-
resources in order to effectively justify and contest the interference of 
power-holders, therefore protecting themselves from domination. 
First of all, the formation of political organizations and industrial 
unions tends to require many onerous steps. For example, employees 
wanting to form industrial unions would need to canvass support from 
other workers, or allies outside of the workplace; they would have to find 
ways of making decisions about who should lead and motivate the union; 
they would have to tread through red tape for the union to be approved by 
government agencies. It is obvious that going through the appropriate 
motions would be immensely time-consuming. Even if employees chose 
instead to join pre-existing unions, they would still require time to decide 
which union to join, as well as obtain the union’s approval to represent 
them, and communicate the issues that they wish to negotiate. In addition, 
in order for workers to successfully contest retributive decisions by 
employers or managers, they would need to know their rights and 
understand how exactly these have been violated. Again, in order to clearly 
understand what we are entitled to, and how it may apply in particular 
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situations, we would require time to educate ourselves on these matters. In 
some cases, it would involve having to seek legal assistance; locating and 
consulting an appropriate authority on the matter would, no doubt, require 
even more time. 
Participating in workplace decision-making might be comparably 
time-consuming for workers. Suppose that a team of workers is allowed to 
decide on their own rate of compensation, or have a say in an important 
decision that will determine their company’s future path, as opposed to 
these decisions being made autocratically by higher-ups. It is very unlikely 
that all the workers would immediately agree with one another about how 
to act; instead, disagreement would probably have to be teased out, and 
compromise or consensus eventually reached, through a series of 
deliberation. (Tellingly, the hypothesis that more democracy in the 
workplace mean slowing down decision-making, hence harming 
productivity or efficiency, has often been used against advocates.) 
Furthermore, I assume here that the people involved in decision-making 
are not themselves responding arbitrarily or idiosyncratically, but in a 
responsible and well-grounded way. Making well-informed decisions – for 
example, when deciding on a fair rate of compensation – would require the 
employees to perform research on what people in related fields are earning, 
or perhaps to come up with a justification for why persons performing a 
particular task merit more compensation than others performing what 
appears to be a similar one. Simply put, research and reflection for 
collective decision-making requires time. 
I have tried to show why the resource of time is crucial to the 
establishment and maintenance of checking mechanisms in the workplace 
– mechanisms that are necessary to stave off the threat of domination. 
Before concluding this section, I note three final points on time and its 
relation to non-domination. Importantly, given the history of employers’ 
hostility to unionization and workplace democracy, it seems that 
introducing the checking mechanisms described above, in the first place, 
may require concerted effort and struggle from workers – suggesting that 
even more time may be necessary for practical implementation. The 
appropriate time-scale here is years, not months, with no guarantee of 
success. Take, for example, the ongoing attempts of graduate students in 
the US to obtain the right to unionize and the massive obstacles enacted by 
universities. Efforts have been blocked, despite students voting to join 
unions certified by the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), by various 
universities on the grounds that the students should not be considered 
employees (Semuels 2017). A number of universities even hired a law firm 
known for their formidable powers against workers to block graduate 
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students from organizing, signaling that they were prepared to spend years 
in court on the endeavor (Jordan 2017). The ongoing challenges graduate 
students face to successful unionization are likely to intensify given 
Donald Trump’s presidency, under which they expect the NLRB’s 
recognition of graduate students as employees to be reversed (Rivin-Nadler 
2017). As this case demonstrates, workers’ striving for sufficient contestation 
and justification in the workplace can feel like fighting a losing battle – to 
wit, a very time-consuming one.
Secondly, while the core argument I have given is very different in 
essence from Rose’s, it dovetails with hers with respect to temporal 
coordination. Rose argues insightfully that exercising one’s freedom of 
association does not only generally require the resource of free time, but 
also free time that is “shared with one’s fellow associates” (Rose 2016: 93). 
This is because the central exercises of freedom of association, such as 
sharing a meal with one’s family, marching in a rally with one’s political 
co-partisans, or sharing religious services with one’s fellow believers, 
involve engaging in the pursuit at the same time as others (Rose 2016: 94). 
Therefore, citizens must have reasonable access to shared free time in order 
to exercise their freedom of association. Similarly, to a large extent, workers 
need shared time to perform contestory and justificatory activities together. 
Certainly, an individual can learn about the full extent of their employment 
rights, or launch a dispute against the employer on their own. But there is 
an important collective aspect to political organization and deliberation.
While I have chosen to focus on a smaller-scale case to bring out the 
central role of time in addressing specific forms of domination, the above 
arguments are meant to extend to political activity and the republican 
duties of citizens writ large. The kind of political engagement that enables 
political institutions to be effectively justified or contested is inherently 
time-consuming. Citizens need time to vote, run for office, or educate 
themselves on political institutions and political life more generally. For 
example, voting – the most basic form of political participation – often 
requires citizens to head to a particular location and stand in line for their 
turn to vote, which can be rather-time consuming. U. S. federal law does 
not require employers to give their staff time off to vote, and while a number 
of states have instituted their own laws on the matter, with some allowing 
up to three hours off to vote, not all states require that employees be 
remunerated for that time off. Coupled with other competing factors like 
caregiving duties, and the negative impact that losing even a few hours’ 
wages can have, it is no surprise that many people are unable to set aside 
the time to vote, or find themselves having to leave polling stations because 
they cannot afford to continue waiting, thus contributing to voter 
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suppression. It is in this way that citizens need time to be able to protect 
themselves against domination. Without sufficient time for citizens to 
participate in political activities designed to justify or contest power, state 
power cannot be properly kept ‘in check’. 
To conclude this section, on the republican account, possessing sufficient 
time-resources to engage in the justification and contestation of power is 
necessary for persons to protect themselves from domination. This is 
markedly different in tone from the liberal egalitarian picture, where time 
is deemed necessary for exercising our basic rights and opportunities, as 
well as pursuing the ends and projects we find valuable
4. ‘FREE’ VERSUS ‘SUFFICIENT’ TIME?
So far, I have talked a lot about ‘time’, but not free time specifically. I attend 
to this in the final section by arguing that, unlike liberal egalitarians, 
republicans cannot make a case for the importance of the fair distribution of 
free time as a resource in itself. At most, they can make an instrumental 
argument for the fair distribution of free time, as ensuring fair shares of free 
time may be the best means of encouraging political engagement and the 
development of civic virtue, in comparison to the alternative. I explain why 
below. 
4.1 The instrumental necessity of free time
Previously, I argued that many activities with a quintessentially republican 
flavor – and more particularly, those necessary for processes of justification 
and contestation – are inherently time-consuming, and that people need 
time to participate in them. However, this does not establish an argument 
for fair shares of free time. It simply shows that citizens need a sufficient 
portion of time to engage in political activity, and does not say anything 
about their claims to time for pursuits of their own choosing. In contrast, 
Rose’s account does not specify what people ought to be doing with their free 
time beyond pursuing their chosen ends or exercising their formal liberties 
and opportunities. We can use our free time to be activists, surfers, or couch 
potatoes without judgment, so to speak. In other words, it is the liberal 
emphasis on the freedom to do whatever one wants with the allotted time 
that makes it “free”. Without this, republicans cannot make a case for the 
entitlement to fair shares of free time, as opposed to sufficient time for 
political engagement. 
Keeping this in mind, what kind of time-related policies ought republicans 
to endorse? One initial suggestion would be for the state to partition off a 
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certain amount of time to be used exclusively for republican activities. For 
example, very crudely, citizens could be allocated five hours a week that 
would be compulsorily dedicated to some form of civic engagement. Yet this 
looks very unattractive, and unlikely to be endorsed by any present-day 
republican, as enforcement would be deeply problematic. How, exactly, 
would the state ensure that citizens would use the allotted time for political 
purposes alone? To start with, a high level of surveillance and intrusion into 
citizens’ privacy would be required for states to police citizens’ time-usage. 
In practice, the policy might end up licensing more domination on the part 
of the state; it equips the state with an excuse to monitor and control citizens’ 
activity, enhancing its capacity to interfere with their choices on an arbitrary 
basis, and hence running counter to the policy’s purported ends. It also 
seems that unpalatably coercive measures would have to be employed in 
order to deter citizens from misusing their time-share, such as penalizing 
them if they are caught using the time for some other activity. 
Here, it might be objected that at least some republicans have endorsed 
coercive measures to ensure political participation, the case in point being 
mandatory voting, where citizens pay a financial penalty for failing to vote. 
Why, then, shy away from time for compulsory political activity? Yet 
mandatory voting would not involve the same level of intrusiveness, as 
citizens are penalized on the basis of records indicating that they failed to 
vote, rather than having their individual time closely monitored by the state. 
Nor is it as demanding, as citizens are penalized for a one-time failure to act, 
rather than for the failure to regularly engage in republican activities, which 
would plausibly lead to repeated fines for many people who are tired, 
distracted, disillusioned, or simply disinterested in politics. Furthermore, it 
might disproportionately impact less well-off citizens who are already less 
likely to participate in politics, yet for whom monetary fines would be more 
detrimental.
While intrusiveness and demandingness are, on their own, principled 
reasons against enforcing time-periods of compulsory political activity, 
such time-periods would arguably be counterproductive to the cultivation 
of authentic civic virtue. Being forced into regular political engagement 
would most likely turn it into a tiresome chore, draining the activity of any 
meaning or significance. Worse still, being punished for failing to do so 
would almost certainly create resentment and even more disillusionment 
with the practice of politics, rather than feelings of empowerment.
A second possible policy would be conditional time for political activity. 
That is, instead of giving all citizens a period of time they must dedicate to 
political activity, only those who are active members of political groups 
would be given time to participate in it. For example, the state might legally 
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require corporations to give employees who are union members a certain 
amount of time off from work. This alternative policy avoids some of the 
worries I have outlined about compulsory time for political activity. It does 
not force the cultivation of civic virtue, but provides encouragement and 
support to those who have authentically chosen to be civically engaged. 
Furthermore, while it seems rather unlikely that anyone would go to the 
lengths of creating a bogus political organization just so they could use the 
allotted time for non-political pursuits like surfing or video games, imposing 
penalties on bogus organizations seems far less problematic than penalizing 
individuals for how they choose to use their time. For one, enforcing those 
penalties would not require violating the privacy of individuals; political 
organizations do not have an analogous right to privacy. Secondly, members 
of bogus political organizations are exploiting the system by engaging in 
deceit. It seems fair for deceitful behavior to be punished, rather than the 
mere lack of desire for political participation. 
Unfortunately, conditional time also suffers from a fatal flaw. Namely, it 
adopts a very narrow view of what political participation is. Political 
engagement today encompasses a wide variety of activities, including 
marching in a street protest; writing petitions; creating art; or even posting 
on social media like Twitter and Facebook. But none of these forms of 
engagement involve formal membership that we can submit as proof of our 
participation. Only giving time to members of political organizations would 
deprive others of time for valuable political activities that do not hinge on 
membership. Worse still, states would be able to make value judgments 
about what is a valuable or worthwhile political activity that is worth 
supporting. This could risk disadvantaging those who participate in 
activities that the state considers ‘fringe’ or disruptive in some sense, like 
graffiti art or street protests. Furthermore, political organizations that the 
state disapproves of may be barred from qualifying as legitimate 
organizations. 
A final option would be for states to ensure that citizens have fair shares of 
free time that they can use for any activity of their choosing.9 If time is 
necessary for freedom in the republican sense, as I have suggested, it must 
be available robustly, as a matter of right. Citizens would not be given free 
time only at the discretion of the powerful, like their employers. Rather, their 
access to free time would be entrenched by the state, in the form of laws and 
norms, as one of the basic liberties necessary for free undominated status. 
Nevertheless, rather than being a demand of republican justice per se, these 
allotments of free time would serve an instrumental purpose: a more 
9 Here, I leave open how a “fair” share of free time ought to be determined. For a 
detailed discussion of how we can do this, see Rose (2016: 127-134).
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permissive approach to parceling out time-resources would be more 
effective in bringing about robust levels of political participation, which can 
be encouraged in two ways. On a more conventional state-centric view, 
rather than being forced to do so, citizens could be encouraged to use that 
time for political participation through “soft”, non-coercive measures that 
have already been advocated by republicans (including subsidies for political 
activities, civic education, or public campaigns promoting political 
engagement). On a more radical view, the state is corrupt and should not be 
trusted to guide the appropriate use of our free time, as it would likely seek 
to align our behavior with the interests of dominating forces through empty 
civics or other forms of mainstream ideology. Instead, we can carve out a 
major role for counterpublics, or counter-dominating institutions, to educate 
and guide us in our resistance to domination.10 I deliberately leave open the 
question of who the main political influencer over our free time ought to be, 
to show that this policy can be appealing to different varieties of 
republicanism. Either way, the guarantee of free time would be likely to 
encourage political activity amongst citizens in the long run, while avoiding 
the shortfalls of compulsory political engagement or conditional time-
shares. Of course, there is a good chance that most citizens would always 
prefer to use that time to pursue their own goals or projects, shunning 
political activity altogether. But I think that the objections to the other 
policies considered above are sufficiently serious for republicans to bite the 
bullet. 
5. CONCLUSION
In this article, I have sought to make a rather bare-bones argument about 
how republicans can make a case for fair shares of free time, albeit an 
instrumental one. I pointed out that time is necessary for the creation and 
maintenance of non-dominating institutions, because we need sufficient 
time to effectively participate in processes of justification and contestation. 
I went on to suggest that, while this only entitles individuals to sufficient 
shares of time dedicated to these forms of political engagement in theory, 
fair shares of free time may be instrumentally necessary to encourage 
participation in republican activities. 
I have not said anything about what, exactly, constitutes a fair share of 
free time or how to measure the amount of time that would minimally be 
required for healthy civic engagement. Neither have I made any policy 
suggestions for how fair shares of free time can be achieved, a task which 
10 For a parallel case of a dominating agent encouraging political participation by 
those it dominates in order to further its own agenda, see Hertel-Fernandez (2016).
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Rose helpfully takes up in her book. I also do not claim that this route is the 
only one available to republicans for justifying fair shares of free time; 
there may be other, perhaps even more convincing, ways of linking non-
domination to free time. These remaining questions provide fertile ground 
for future discussion. Nevertheless, I hope that my contribution takes an 
important first step in considering a potential republican justification for 
the entitlement to free time.
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